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This article looks at the content strategies of the Russian media and discusses whether 
they conform to humanitarian values. The content strategies that prevailed in different 
eras and the social and psychological effects that they engendered are compared. Special 
attention is paid to conflicts of values and other negative consequences of the communi-
cative incompetence of the media in Russia; this lack of competence poses a threat to the 
information security of society. 
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Humanitarian values in the modern context
The information era and “media reality” have brought about global conditions for-
cing one out of one’s traditional environment and into the sphere of virtual images, 
virtual relations, and media structures that often differ greatly from one’s initial 
interests. 
At present, the humanistic mission of journalism is facing a severe test. The 
revolutionary media processes that have been taking place in recent decades have 
a great influence on the possibility of maintaining and developing humanitarian 
values. The long-standing historic contingence between man’s social nature and 
the humanitarian, communicative and information mission of the media is now at 
odds with the commercial interests of property owners as well as with many social 
and cultural processes originating in digitalization and the widespread use of the 
Internet. The changes taking place within media landscapes are quite controversial; 
they are not always viewed as unequivocally positive phenomena.
The creation of information superhighways and multimedia provides great 
opportunities for developing one’s powers, useful communication, education and 
enlightenment, interaction and creative cooperation, civil rights and participa-
tive democracy; we have every reason to talk about the social and anthropologi-
cal transformations resulting from the rapidly changing information structure of Psychological aspects of the content strategies of the Russian media    129
mass communications. Absolutely positive assessments of this process were typical 
in its early stage, before all the possible situations, risks, and consequences were 
defined. Further on, at the turn of this century and mainly in the first decade of 
it, not only the theorists of mass communication and communication science but 
also the broad public began to express their concern about the controversial nature 
of transformations and trends that pose a threat to human development: the dra-
matic commercialization and privatization of the media; the commoditization of 
information products, which brings about the reduction of the public sphere; the 
segmentation of society; virtual escapism; cultural apathy; the individual’s vulner-
ability to low-quality information; total infotainment; the decline in the written 
cultural tradition and of reasoning abilities.
Philosophers, sociologists, and psychologists have arrived at the conclusion 
that mass communication as a peculiar social phenomenon is nothing but a com-
munication surrogate, a simulacrum that fails to tackle the tasks of understand-
ing and of creative cooperation, which remain the essential conditions for human 
development. Consequently, there is no point in setting excessively high goals for 
mass communication and in expecting that the development of the mass media will 
automatically bring humanity closer to perfection. True communication is marked 
by making human life a top value; but the communicative strategies arising from 
information consumerism and from providing high profits to the owners of mass 
media contribute to the devaluation of human life. However neither the nature of 
the mass media nor the peculiarities of modern cyber-journalism are to be regard-
ed as factors that make human-development goals unreachable; on the contrary, 
they bring about the possibility of reaching such goals. 
Another important factor that brings into focus the subject of the humanitarian 
values of the media in a psychology context is connected with the massive trans-
formation of the Russian social environment. Russian society is facing the active 
renewal of values and priorities. There is hardly any overlap among the key values; 
the conflicts are no longer resolved along the lines of old priorities and ideals. Such 
changes are an integral part of any transition period; however, the culture of pri-
oritizing values, which helps prevent enormous inner shocks, is not developed in 
our society. The social history of Russia in regard to human development is unique 
and dramatic; the psychological tension has always been high: “Man doesn’t feel 
good here”; “Russians have never loved the human. Never been proud of it. Never 
built monuments to it. The human as such is not so interesting” (Giryonok, 2010, 
p. 180). As opposed to “strongmen,” the Russian cultural elite has always believed 
that grieving and rejoicing with people to be its moral responsibility and has always 
followed this principle. 
If we consider just the contemporary, post-Soviet period in Russian history, 
we have to admit that the social price of the reforms was too high and incom-
mensurable with the positive humanitarian achievements realized (Khalturina & 
Korotaev, 2006; Rimashevskaya, 2003; Ryvkina, 2001; Zaslavskaya, 2002). “The 
Russian cross,” “the great criminal revolution,” “the new poor” have become the 
cultural symbols of the new Russia, proving that “the subject turning to the symbol 
when faced with an uncertain situation … can be viewed as the zone of proximal 
development in the cognitive activity of both humanity as a whole and a particular 
individual” (Veraksa, 2012, p. 69).130    T. I. Frolova
No matter how advanced and promising the social changes are from a histori-
cal perspective, one can’t but admit that human potential and moral health have 
been damaged greatly and not recovered yet. “The drama of changes” (Ryvkina, 
2001) can be observed above all in personal disorientation: a feeling of helpless-
ness, passiveness and apathy, anxiety, and nostalgia for the past. 
Another context for the development of today’s communicative practice is the 
turn to the human being as the general vector of modern liberal research. Such 
statements as “the subject of the human is becoming the general subject of all sci-
ences,” “the humanitarian paradigm of science,” “the anthropological grounds of 
post-nonclassical science,” “accepting the anthropocentric concept of society,” and 
“overcoming social realism and technocracy” have been proclaimed as the prin-
ciples for understanding global problems. The multidimensionality of human be-
ings brings about a new image of social reality and leads to viewing society through 
the prism of an individual and determining the essence of “human existentials” 
(Ananyev, 2010; Gurevich, 2010). The human being has been the central subject 
in philosophy and psychology from the times of the ancient thinkers. But the 20th 
century and especially the beginning of the 21st century were marked by a true “an-
thropological boom,” which demonstrated fundamental changes in the approach 
to understanding the human being, and by the establishment of a number new 
science disciplines (Barulin, 2007; Berger, Berger, & Collins, 2004; Frolov, 1989;   
Guseinov, 2009; Mamardashvili, 1996). The global acknowledgement of general 
humanitarian values was preceded by a lengthy process of elaborating them in the 
contexts of philosophy, ethics, and psychology* and by the social and cultural ex-
pertise of humanity. 
Special attention should be paid to the concept of human development, which 
resulted from the postwar search for peace, harmony, and the well-being of hu-
mans. In the 1990s this concept served as the basis for the UN Development Pro-
gram (UN Development Program website: http://www.un.org/ru/development/). 
The key points of the concept are as follows: well-being is not limited to material 
aspects and should be assessed by the ability of people to lead lives that they con-
sider worthy; human development reflects the expansion of human choices; the key 
measures of human development are long life, education, and material well-being; 
to lead a decent life people do not need ever-increasing income; steady human de-
velopment involves equal access to development opportunities, and the observance 
of human rights is the essential condition for that; development level and cultural 
peculiarities must not serve as an excuse for violating human rights. The destiny 
of any national society is determined by the status of human potential in it. Rus-
sian scientists accept this concept on the whole but stress the fact that the “the UN 
trinomial” (income, health, and education) emphasizes these conditions of human 
development, while the question of the aim and essence of development remains 
unanswered. It therefore makes sense to use a broader list of characteristics of hu-
*  Special attention in this connection should be paid to prominent thinkers of the 20th century: 
the representatives of Russian religious philosophy (N. A. Berdyaev, L. Shestov, S. L. Frank), 
of the phenomenological and existential schools of philosophy (E. Husserl, M. Heidegger, 
K. Jaspers, J. P. Sartre), of humanistic psychology (E. Fromm, A. Maslow, K. Yung, V. Frankl), 
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man potential including both physical and mental health, on which overall human 
capability depends; readiness to have a family and bring up children; skills and 
qualifications; level of adaptation to social infrastructure; attitudes toward culture 
and values; and psychological competence (Yudin, 2007). These components em-
brace not so much the economic as the psychological and especially the cultural, 
spiritual, and moral sides of human existence. The importance of these character-
istics to human development causes them to be regarded as the objective form of 
humanitarian values. 
establishment of the humanitarian media agenda
As we can see, the need for information strategies that conform to the psychologi-
cal status of society is critical. This need is reinforced by the transformation of the 
national media system: “Having readily accepted commercialization challenges, 
the commercial media model forced out many socially and culturally meaning-
ful points of the agenda by actively promoting the new culture of consumption” 
(Vartanova, 2010). The links among the psychological aspects of the media, mass-
communication trends, and actual media practice can be analyzed at various levels 
and from a variety of aspects. 
From a historical point of view, Russia’s expertise in putting together a humani-
tarian agenda is undoubtedly interesting. Certain traditions of Russian journalism 
can serve as cultural ties to and provide the value basis for today’s humanitarian 
agenda, the vitality of which depends on more than just the general level of compe-
tence of the journalist community. Its integral component is the collective uncon-
scious. Before the Revolution, the Russian intelligentsia was united by the idea of 
social service; the charity press, which provided the public arena for defining the 
humanistic grounds of a future multinational democratic society, was in bloom. 
The “social topic” was always present in the Soviet press. The nature of the so-
cial relations of the time, the ideological pressure, the paternalistic culture, the im-
position of collectivist morals—all significantly altered the essence of the social and 
personal elements of society and brought journalism, under tight control, down 
to reporting on social and living matters (The problematics of newspaper presenta-
tions, 1975; The problematics of the media, 2008). However, the Soviet period and 
Soviet journalism formulated many valuable principles that are rooted deeply in 
social conscience: social protection, mutual respect, personal honesty, the common 
person’s dignity and work, fairness, responsibility for fellow citizens, sincerity and 
unselfishness in person-to-person relationships. Only recently has Russian society 
realized that the collapse of the old social order was not only a historically based 
change of regimes but also a major psychological loss, and first of all it was the loss 
of inner moral stability. New consumer values and personal opportunities do not 
make up for the lost friendliness, fairness, and feeling of security.
In the post-Soviet period the humanitarian journalistic agenda went through 
a number of transformations. At the turn of the 1990s the discovery of new topics 
and of whole new spheres of life significantly increased the degree of emotion in the 
media. All the most urgent problems were voiced, social matters were discussed; 
however, further on the quality of the reporting on social and psychological issues 
went down dramatically. 132    T. I. Frolova
In the 1990s the coverage of personal problems and social links was in decline. 
The politicization of the media and the dispersal of ownership pushed personal 
relations out of the focus of public attention. While putting together their com-
municative strategies, the leading media placed their stakes on political influence, 
often leaving no room for “everyday drama.” Only an occasional voice would call 
for turning to the person in the chaos of radical changes, but personal space on the 
whole remained empty. The human was replaced with the idea. 
In the mid-1990s, a different process emerged. Commercialization, the rapid 
development of the mass press and television, the prioritization of large circula-
tions and high ratings resulted in turning personal problems, which had always 
raised great public interest but had been forced out of the media arena by political 
and economic discourse, into a kind of teaser. Particular cases of personal inter-
est in the mass press were numerous and varied but, at the same time, one-sided 
and quite primitive. Personal space was narrowed, simplified, and mutilated. On 
the one hand, scandals, sensations, domestic crimes, private life, and celebrity 
gossip got extensive coverage. Private life has always attracted attention and in-
cluded existential problems; however, the mass media managed only to single out 
those matters and to raise public interest in them without discussing their essence. 
Television became the clearest illustration of this trend. The common person got 
pushed out of the mass-communication arena again, this time by business. On 
the other hand, the audience was attacked by all kinds of “useful information” 
and advice on consumer issues: household problems, sales of and overall demand 
for goods, fitness, travel, folk medicine, and so on. But there was still no place for 
the human being; usefulness was the essential point. Personal destiny in the new 
social reality remained a personal business rather than the object of public dis-
course. Despite the expansion of the humanitarian agenda, the ideological shal-
lowness and the lack of values came at a high price both to the society and to the 
individual. The so-called pseudo-humanitarian agenda got its shape: despite the 
turn to the human being, it did not actually handle the problems of social organi-
zation, civic upbringing, moral support in situations of cultural trauma—that is, 
all the preconditions for the acquisition of personal meanings and the harmoniza-
tion of personal relations. The new agenda was based on a general lack of balance 
and did not provide ways of acquiring balance. The public dissatisfaction with 
what “the newspapers say” and what the electronic media offered was so great 
that some researchers even came up with the thesis of the “asociality of press.” The 
social consequences of this media alienation from personal problems in the 1990s 
turned out to be dramatic. Social topics did get press coverage, but in most cases 
no solutions were suggested, no hopes expressed, while demoralization, torpor, 
and disunity were aggravated and the feeling that the country would constantly 
have to balance on the verge of a disaster was promoted. Admonishments, sen-
sationalism, reductionism, negativism, and other manipulation techniques pre-
vailed in the new communication strategies. 
At the start of the new millennium a new humanitarian agenda began to take 
shape. A lot had changed in the minds of the Russian people; a new psychological 
reality had started developing in regard to the media. New social subjects appeared 
in the general media, information/analysis weeklies, certain television programs, 
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creative methods and techniques, fundamental changes in graphic design and sty-
listic solutions, and continuous differentiation of typical models, solutions were 
found for humanitarian problems; these solutions varied in content, meaning, cre-
ative approach, and completion level. Journalists whose professional mission was 
to report on the problems of people on the basis of humanistic principles were 
singled out. The current situation presupposes that in the near future the volume 
and quality of the coverage of humanitarian topics will finally bring about serious 
changes in social communication, and the social communities that are now taking 
shape will be able to influence decision-making and contribute to the improvement 
of human and social development.
Current content strategies
Nevertheless, many obstacles to instituting these positive processes remain; one of 
the key factors is the lack of journalists’ communicative competence. Quite often 
the attempts of those in charge to promote certain problems in the media in order 
to get onto the daily agenda are accompanied by a great degree of ignorance about 
the media and their internal principles and give rise to a public response that does 
not help in finding efficient solutions. Content-analysis research devoted to various 
aspects of social life in Russia, such as charity, gender issues, family conflicts, social 
isolation, resocialization of the elderly, which are covered in hundreds of thousands 
of media reports, has demonstrated that these reports are characterized by an in-
complete life cycle (Donors Foundation, 2011; Frolova, 2012; Smirnova & Frolova, 
2011; Vartanova, Smirnova, Frolova, 2012). 
Today media communications in Russia, as well as in the rest of the world, play 
a special role in modeling social problems—that is, in making sure that a problem 
that can become urgent for the society is granted public status and psychological le-
gitimacy and receives due development, discussion, and the attention of the media, 
politicians, and the people. The success of any solution to a problem is determined 
by the amount and quality of public attention it receives. 
However, the capacity of the media is limited; they cannot model all potential 
problems, which therefore have to compete to gain entrance into the print and 
broadcast media. Getting into and staying on the public agenda is controlled by 
“gatekeepers,” among whom journalists hold a prominent position. The selection 
criteria include dramatic effect, originality, cultural and political preferences, but 
first and foremost the problem has to provide the press with constant coverage op-
portunities that meet newsroom standards. Communication processes and other 
professional and social contacts should be normalized between journalists and the 
people speaking on behalf of the resolution of specific problems (Sconfield, Meyer, 
Griffin, 2000).
The above-mentioned factors explain why many fundamental social problems, 
such as the deplorable state of the roads, domestic violence, alcoholism, the under-
developed social infrastructure, common ignorance, lack of a healthy way of life, 
the tradition of disrespect to individuals, do not have the status of urgent problems 
in Russian society. 
In respect to information security, the trends at the individual level are de-
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and is determined by a number of factors, among them: “the motivational factor 
(with the domination of the failure-avoidance motive and the unsatisfied self-ap-
proval need); the factor of the emotional-regulation disorders, represented by both 
excessive emotional repression and lack of emotional control” (Zinchenko & Per-
vichko, 2012, p. 157). As a whole, the multilevel psychosomatic syndrome can be 
seen in the “one-dimensional modernization” of Russian society, Russian citizens’ 
“anti-modernization behavior,” and their devotion to outdated behavior patterns 
and the power of tradition. Particular concern is caused by research showing that 
“about 30% of the teenage participants aged 13–17 demonstrated a much higher 
degree of emotional ill-being and even depressiveness than is expected of this age 
group” (Podolsky, Karavanova, Idobaeva, Haymans, 2011, p. 11).
Everyone is aware of these problems, but because they occur every day, day 
after day, somehow they are not news anymore. For example, the criminal images 
disseminated by the media are quite different from those presented by the statistics 
and, even more, by the actual crime scene. As a result, people develop groundless 
fears, and attempts to toughen the existing legislation get full support, whereas the 
true threats are hardly recognized. The paradox is that their commonness prevents 
us from combating them. The press may sporadically raise interest in such topics 
and thereby precipitate the most unexpected and negative psychological effects. 
The Russian audience is quite familiar with these “media tides,” which cover up less 
noticeable but rather meaningful subjects. Thus, a vicious circle is created: society 
does not have enough information about the problem and does not realize its im-
portance and as a result is unable to protect itself. 
To complete the psychological landscape of the media, one should highlight 
another factor: drawing media attention to a problem is not the only task gatekeep-
ers face, although this aspect is usually named as the key one. The mobilization of 
the society and the authorities conducted by means of the mass media and in other 
public arenas can bring collateral damage. Similar information may lose the ap-
peal of novelty, after which the number of publications on a topic goes down. The 
regression of the problem can be observed, and for many years it becomes a painful 
but common issue in the society. At the inner level, people believe such a problem 
cannot be resolved. The plentitude of information flows leads to a superficial atti-
tude toward the problem: the audience is aware of the matter but no action is taken; 
thus, psychologically, knowledge substitutes for action. 
Another explanation is that, in an era of information overload and high-speed 
communication, people lack time and have almost no “extra sympathy” for news 
stories about the problems and sorrows of their fellow citizens. Today’s audience 
still remembers the “glasnost” epoch, which provided access to endless negative 
information about the present and the past. No one could stay indifferent to those 
descriptions, and people who had experienced the emotional shock became the pil-
lar of the radical transformations that followed. But shortly afterward a new notion 
came to life, chernukha (the seamy side), which at first denoted the expansion to 
extraordinary levels of information on crimes and emergency situations. However, 
further on, in the mind of the people, it came to denote any news bits concerning 
the social consequences of the political and economic reforms (low salaries, the 
collapse of the social sphere, declining birth rates, the spread of social diseases, 
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factual information. Negativism had turned into the dominating communicative 
strategy for many media, and the audience had to escape from it in order to protect 
itself. 
The emotional burnout of the Russian audience is a special topic. It can be 
explained by both the objective realia and the contemporary history of the Rus-
sian media, as well as by a number of other factors. One can find many examples 
of situations in which the carelessly chosen communicative strategies of the media 
prevented progress in covering urgent topics even after they became the focus of 
public attention (Frolova, 2009). Problems often fall out of notice because of the 
protection mechanisms of “super-subject activity.” Zinchenko suggests that secu-
rity be defined as “a system phenomenon involving various levels of subject and 
super-subject activity. . . . Each level is characterized by its own subjects of security 
as a type of activity, the subject being an individual or a group of individuals, a 
society, state or the world community” (Zinchenko, 2011, p. 13). When the society 
gives up on certain problems because of information dysfunction, the society be-
comes the collective subject of its own psychological security. 
A media information build-up takes place when a topic no longer seems exotic, 
and the audience gets used to it (the legitimization stage); the topic can provoke 
an official response and be acknowledged at the level where decisions are made. 
However, sometimes in real life the decisions are taken before the psychological 
mobilization of the audience has been achieved; this process may hinder problem 
handling. When decisions are taken ahead of time society can be prevented from 
understanding the matter and from accepting solutions (for example, in the case of 
the “nano” issues). 
Moreover, quite frequently both the society and the solutions are ready, but 
with intensive media coverage the official action plan (for example, demographic 
development) is subject to criticism by the public. Solutions imposed on society 
highlight the social and psychological conflict: everyone agrees with the definition 
of the problem, but there are not enough practical suggestions from society, and 
a consensus deficit can be observed. Consequently, society achieves consent “by 
contradiction,” and the potential for public involvement is wasted on criticism and 
denial of the official action plan. For example, in the case of “maternity capital” 
(federal subsidies for multiple-child families), after the suggestion was debated and 
rejected, the feeling that the work had been done was created; thus, once again, 
knowledge and sympathy replaced practical action. A yet more significant exam-
ple of pathology or information dysfunction is the so-called overheated problems; 
work on these problems stops at the stage of acknowledgement and legitimization. 
Recognized and accepted by society, they either are put aside for the sake of os-
tensibly more urgent issues (this situation was quite typical in the mid- and late 
1990s, when all the basic solutions in the social sector were postponed and society 
was left in a state of cultural underdevelopment) or do not get timely and drastic 
solutions because of use of the “gradual approach” (this situation can be seen in the 
case of the never-ending sporadic “reformation” of the education system, which has 
actually brought about its collapse, and in the case of the alcoholism pandemic). 
Previously information dysfunction meant, for instance, the imbalance between 
the quality and amount of information in various types of media (for example, 
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data about it in the general media) or the artificially created leveling of a problem 
(“alcoholics cannot recover”), which postpones finding a solution; today the effort 
that leads to results at the stage of acknowledgement and legitimization is no longer 
enough. 
Finally, possibly the most meaningful problem in today’s humanitarian agenda 
is that the Russian people are unable to gain a footing in the sphere of national val-
ues. It is quite obvious that the results of polls concerning the most urgent problems 
of society differ greatly from the predominant topics of public discourse. Journal-
ists often take a stance that the majority of their audience does not share. Besides, 
discourse that can be characterized as “patriotic,” “catastrophic,” or “apologetic” 
rarely reveals any striving for consent, partnership, or harmony. Our public sphere 
is inhumane and aggressive. And although this “polyphony” of social life can, to a 
certain extent, be viewed as a means of development, human life during a war of 
values acquires an extreme existential tension, giving rise to aggression, violence, 
and frustration. The media create a cult of a strong person who is able to overcome 
this tension, to succeed, to break through, a person strong enough to bypass and 
deny traditional human values. Quite often, by their actions, journalists justify an 
inhumane and even merciless attitude toward deviance; a perfect illustration is the 
popular format of “people’s talk shows” on television. 
The increasing redundancy of information about high-profile topics, the ag-
gravating conversion of human problems into a commodity, the expanding split in 
values are the new realia of the media agenda that pose a threat to the information 
security of society. The lack of social, psychological, and values-based harmony in 
Russian society remains a significant factor hindering civilized development.
However, positive trends can undoubtedly be observed along the way as well. 
Vartanova points out that although the social sphere and civic institutions have 
found themselves in the rear guard of the transformation, the media still do have 
“significant potential for promoting this process [in] public circles” (Vartanova, 
2010). Consequently, we have grounds for an optimistic prognosis. 
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